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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FACT
WITNESS PAYMENT
Ezra Friedman and Eugene Kontorovich1
ABSTRACT
In this paper we discuss the disparate treatment of perceptual (‘‘fact’’) witnesses
and expert witnesses in the legal system. We highlight the distinction between
the perceptual act of witnessing and the act of testifying, and argue that
although there might be good reasons to regulate payments to fact witnesses,
the customary prohibition on paying them for their services is not justified by ref-
erence to economic theory. We propose considering a court mediated system
for compensating fact witnesses so as to encourage witnessing of legally impor-
tant events. We construct a simple model of witness incentives, and simulate the
effects of several possible payment mechanisms. Although it is possible that any
system that offers a financial incentive will induce some unreliable witness testi-
mony, we argue that the current system also provides incentives for biased testi-
mony, so it is not clear that a payment system would lower the quality of witness
testimony.
1. INTRODUCTION
1Two different legal regimes govern the market for expert witnesses and
perceptual (‘‘fact’’) witnesses in civil litigation. Litigants secure the services
of expert witnesses through the payment of a negotiated rate. Fact wit-
nesses, by contrast, receive zero compensation for their services. Further-
more, unlike experts, whose testimony is voluntary, fact witnesses can be
compelled through subpoena.2 Thus experts’ labor is protected by the
property rule typical in contractual settings, while perceptual witnesses
fall under a liability rule with compensation set at zero. This two-fold
1 Assistant Professor and Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. The
authors thank participants in the Yale Law, Economics and Organization Workshop, and
Ron Allen, Ronen Avraham, Bruce Kobayashi, William Landes, Richard Posner, Chris San-
chirico, and Max Schanzenbach for their comments. Special thanks go to David Lisitza.
2 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 45. There are territorial and other limits on the subpoena power, such
that it not impose ‘‘undue burden or expense’’ on the witness. Id. at (c)(1).
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distinction (compensation and consent) between the market for expert
and fact witnesses spans Western legal systems.
2 This paper takes these differences as the point of departure for examin-
ing the economics of fact witnesses. We show how the differences between
fact and expert witnesses justify the use of a liability rule for the former, but
do not explain the rule of zero payment. The paper explains that witness-
ing—perceiving phenomenon that will be relevant to litigation—is an
activity distinct from testifying. Whether someone witnesses litigation-rel-
evant facts depends in part on their voluntary actions. Thus the amount of
fact-witnessing is sensitive to incentives. The current non-payment regime
results in a socially suboptimal amount of information being generated.
Moreover, inadequate compensation for the costs of testifying about
what one has witnessed taxes witnessing, encouraging people to avoid wit-
nessing or to conceal that they have witnessed. This suggests that the cur-
rent system produces suboptimal levels of witnessing.
3 There is, however, a strong reason for treating fact and expert witnesses
differently, one that has been thus far neglected. Fact witnesses possess a
strong natural monopoly. Thus market-rate payment for fact-witnesses
could be even more problematic than non-payment, as it would allow
for holdout and rent extraction by the witness. This paper explores the
effects of an intermediate regime that has not been previously considered:
a regulated-rate payment system for fact witnesses. We conclude that a
system with properly set payments for fact witnesses could be superior
to both the status quo and the mostly unregulated property rule applicable
to experts. We acknowledge that in many cases the administrative costs
and practical difficulties of witness payment might often outweigh the ben-
efits. However, a framework for considering such a system helps show
when witness payment may be desirable, and offers a richer positive
account of why the market for fact witnesses is regulated so differently
from the market for experts.
4 To the extent that the law and economics literature on evidence has dealt
with witness issues, it has focused on the payment and performance of
expert witnesses or party witnesses (Posner 1999; Shapira 1998). Yet the
much larger phenomenon of third party fact witnesses has seldom been
examined (Sanchirico 2007). Indeed, the literature generally assumes
that all evidence is within the control of the litigants or other interested
parties, and their incentives determine the amount of evidence production
(Sanchirico 2001, 2007; Acconcia et al. 2009). One notable exception
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(O’Flaherty & Sethi 2010) focuses on the interaction between a party (de-
fendant) and a non-party witness. This paper broadens the analysis to
include disinterested third-parties with relevant information. It also con-
tributes to the literature by showing how existing legal rules affect evidence
production independent of litigant conduct.
5Section 2 examines the differences in the markets for fact and expert wit-
nesses. It shows how fact witnessing is a distinct activity from testifying,
and shows how compensation can affect the level of witnessing. Section 3
examines the difficulties a compensation system would have to overcome,
including incentives for perjury and the overproduction of witnesses. The
Appendix develops a simple model of witness behavior and simulates the
response to several proposed mechanisms for rewarding witnesses.
6The paper is primarily directed at witnessing facts relevant to civil cases,
though much of the analysis is applicable to criminal cases. In the latter
context, the government already has methods of encouraging witnesses,
such as cash rewards or reduced sentences. Criminal cases also pose partic-
ular problems of adverse selection by witnesses and high costs of witness-
ing due to intimidation.
2. EXPERT VERSUS FACT WITNESSES
7The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
adopted by many states, reflects the basic division between expert and
fact witness fees: ‘‘The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it
is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that
it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.’’ Similarly, the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the predecessor to the
Model Rules, allows the expert witness to be paid for her ‘‘services,’’ but
other witnesses can only be paid for actual ‘‘expenses reasonably incur-
red. in attending or testifying.’’ (Rule 7-109(C)). The distinction with
expert witnesses is made explicit: ‘‘A lawyer should not pay or agree to
pay a non-expert witness an amount in excess of reimbursement
for expenses and financial loss incident to his being a witness; however,
a lawyer may pay or agree to pay an expert witness a reasonable fee for
his services as an expert.’’ These rules have been interpreted in most juris-
dictions as allowing for the payment of actual expenses incurred in coming
to court to testify, including, in some places, lost wages or other mea-
sures of opportunity costs. (This issue will be discussed below.) But no
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jurisdiction allows compensation for the service of having witnessed or for
any activities of the witness before being summoned (Villa 2001; Maskin &
Cailteux 1999).
8 There is no comprehensive theoretical account of the different rules for
payment of fact and expert witnesses. Payments for fact and expert wit-
nesses are generally discussed separately in the legal practice literature
and thus little light is shed on their comparative treatment. The reasons
generally offered for nonpayment of fact witnesses are concerns about
encouraging witnesses to color or even fabricate their testimony; increasing
the costs of litigation and putting it beyond the reach of many (Kinsler &
Colton 1999); and more abstract notions of a civic duty to reveal legally
relevant information.3 Of course, none of these policies explains the differ-
ential treatment between fact and expert witnesses: slanted testimony and
costly litigation are vices often attributed to the use of experts.
9 The conventional understanding of why expert witnesses do get paid is
that they had to invest time and money to obtain the expertise that makes
their testimony valuable. The possibility of earning expert fees raises the
potential earnings in various fields and thus makes them more attractive
to potential entrants (Thornton & Ward 1999). If not compensated suffi-
ciently, people would underinvest in developing the relevant expertise. The
implicit assumption behind treating fact witnesses differently is that
because they did not make particular investments to secure their informa-
tion, their actions are insensitive to incentives, so there is no need to com-
pensate them.
2.1. Market Power
10 As will be shown below, the differences between expert and fact witnesses
do not justify the rule of nonpayment for the latter. The differences do jus-
tify the other variation in their treatment: property rule protection of
experts’ testimony versus the compelled access to fact witnesses’ testimony.
There is a competitive market in most areas of expertise. Many are able to
obtain the education necessary to qualify as an expert. One can expect that
expert witness compensation would be competitive. Not so with fact wit-
nesses. Having perceived something that has already transpired, fact wit-
nesses possess one of the purest natural monopolies imaginable. A past
3 Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n, 865 F. Supp.
1516 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
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event will not be produced or discovered in greater quantities. Given that
fact witnesses have market power, in the crucible of litigation they would
demand monopolist rates, extracting the social surplus of the litigation.
Strategic behavior by such witnesses could lead to bargaining breakdown,
keeping their testimony out of court and reducing the accuracy of litiga-
tion.
11This difference between fact and expert witnesses justifies compul-
sory process but not nonpayment. The standard response to a problem
of natural monopoly is compelled access and rate regulation. Private
market power in the face of a social need is the familiar problem of
takings, which is governed by a liability rule. But with takings, pay-
ment is made at a governmental estimate of fair market value. Even
if one assumes that witnessing is a windfall benefit obtained without
any prior investment, the standard response would be taxation rather
than confiscation.
2.2. Witnessing and Incentives
12The standard justification for nonpayment of perceptual witnesses assumes
that witnessing is entirely a windfall and thus insensitive to incentives. Yet
the level of witnessing depends in part on effort and choice. To understand
this, it is important to distinguish between witnessing and testifying. The
former refers to the actual perception of an occurrence. The latter refers
to recounting in court what one previously witnessed. One can witness
and not testify (if one does not come forward and is not subpoenaed);
and testify without witnessing (perjury). Many jurisdictions allow some
payment for testimony: meaning the time and expense of going to court.
Even if this were fully compensatory, it would not compensate for the sep-
arate and prior activity of witnessing.
13Fact witnessing may involve investment and effort. If perceptual wit-
nesses were paid for their information, one would expect an increase in
perceptual witnessing. Going further, people may draw on their private
information to position themselves in settings where they might witness
the most legally valuable phenomena. The extent to which this happens
would of course depend on the prospects of compensation.
14While it may not be obvious today that fact witnessing is responsive to
incentives, one hundred years ago this was not understood with respect to
expert witnesses either. John Henry Wigmore explained the then-current
rule against paying expert witnesses by observing that ‘‘it is only by accident
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and not by premeditation or deliberate resolve with reference to the litiga-
tion that either [a fact or expert witness] has become desirable as a source
of evidence; neither the expert in blood-stains nor the bystander at a mur-
der has expressly put himself in the way of qualifying as a witness so that no
claim based on a special dedication of services for the case can be predi-
cated of one rather than the other’’ (Wigmore 1905, x 2203 at p. 2986).
15 Today, the notion that the forensic expert did not invest in his human
capital at least partially with an eye to litigation can be dismissed as naive.
Yet in Wigmore’s time, it may have been true in the simple sense precisely
because payments to expert witnesses were not generally permitted. Just as
it is circular to argue for nonpayment of experts because they had thus far
not been paid and yet acquired their expertise anyway, one cannot say pay-
ing fact witnesses is unnecessary because they obtained their socially valu-
able information ‘‘only by accident.’’ While in a static perspective, payment
of both kinds of witnesses will not retroactively change the supply of wit-
nesses in the current period, in a dynamic setting, the availability of pay-
ment will affect the supply of both kinds of witnesses.
16 Consider some illustrations of how compensation can affect witnessing.
Under the current regime, a passerby might not stop to observe the con-
dition of victims of a car crash. Even though such immediate observation
could be very valuable in subsequent litigation, under a no-compensation
regime passers-by have no incentive to witness. In another situation, one
might walk out of the room when a colleague notorious for sexual harass-
ment enters. A retiree who has a choice between watching television for an
hour and keeping an eye on a corner famous for its automobile collisions
may be more likely in a witness payment regime, to choose the latter
option. People who live in violent neighborhoods may be encouraged to
put cameras outside their houses to witness events on the street.
17 The situation is analogous to the problem of salvaging buried treasure.
As with witnessing, the largely fortuitous nature of treasure-finding does
not make it insensitive to marginal inputs of effort. A person walking
along the beach might receive a hint of the possibility of treasure (a gleam-
ing thing in the sand, perhaps) and decide whether to incur some cost of
investigation (such as dirtying her clothes) depending upon what she
would be likely to keep should she find something. Confiscatory policies
will also prevent treasure finders from revealing their discovery, as well
as discouraging professional treasure-hunting. An optimal policy would
compensate finders to promote disclosure and some level of search, but
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would not give them the full social value of the discovery so as not to
induce excessive and duplicative treasure hunting (Landes & Posner
1978). As will be seen, the problem of duplication is less severe with fact
witnesses, as there can be social value from multiple witnesses observing
the same thing, while there is not social value to two people finding the
same buried treasure.
18One may wonder whether the prospect of small payment would induce
people to witness, given the low probability that one will succeed in wit-
nessing information relevant to a tort suit. The likelihood may be suffi-
ciently low for most people to discount it altogether. Retired people who
spend the day sitting on a bench could pick a corner known for its traffic
accidents. More generally, while in the course of a normal day the likeli-
hood of witnessing relevant information may be very low, in certain situ-
ations it becomes higher. Payment is unlikely to induce most people to go
looking for accidents. But when someone hears the screech of tires, the
prospect of payment may provide the incentive to turn around and observe
what happens. To return to the buried treasure scenario, a reward for find-
ers will not encourage most people to comb the beach with a metal detec-
tor (though again, some do this). The reward becomes relevant when one
sees a glimmer under the sand and must choose whether to explore further.
2.3. Paying Perceptual Witnesses in Current Practice
19While the expert/fact witness disparity is a formal feature of the justice
system, paying perceptual witnesses for more than just testimony is already
an explicit feature of several laws and practices. For example, police depart-
ments provide cash bounties for informants or leniency at trial for incrim-
inating plea bargains and jailhouse snitches. The Internal Revenue Service
pays informants a ‘‘reward in proportion to the value of the information’’
they provide on tax evasion by others—a percentage of the government’s
recovery in a subsequent suit or investigation (U.S. Internal Revenue Serv-
ice 2004). The False Claim Act allows those who reveal fraud by govern-
ment contractors to share in the recovery.4 In some cases, the leniency
or other considerations for criminal informants serve partially as payment
for the risk of testifying, rather than for witnessing. However, payments to
jailhouse snitches and qui tam plaintiffs do not depend on their testify-
ing in court. Rather, these are payments designed to encourage actual
4 31 U.S.C. x 3729–3733.
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witnessing—the obtaining of legally valuable information (Scott 2006). In
all these contexts, witness payment is only available for those, usually with
a prior relationship with the defendants, who produce information on
behalf of the government in criminal or quasi-criminal contexts.5 Yet pri-
vate parties also implicitly pay for the activity of witnessing. An associate
who is brought along by an executive to sit in during an employee termi-
nation or other meeting that could result in litigation, so that he can
subsequently testify about anything that transpired, can be seen as a pro-
fessional witness. More blatantly, in Great Britain, tabloids pay for infor-
mation even from sources who are witnesses to crimes. Anecdotal
evidence suggests people insinuate themselves with likely defendants so
they might later be paid to divulge information to a newspaper, an illustra-
tion of how witness payment can have ex ante effects on investments in the
production of information.
2.4 Other Uncompensated Takings of Personal Services
20 Subpoenaed fact witness testimony amounts to a levy of personal services.
Forced, uncompensated labor is anomalous under U.S. law. Here we con-
sider witnessing alongside the other isolated examples, jury service and the
(discontinued) military draft. The draft is in effect a tax on young able-
bodied men. The ‘‘draft tax’’ may be thought to have relatively little incen-
tive effects, since it is difficult to substitute away from being a healthy
young man (though not impossible, as evidenced by self-inflicted wounds
and flight to Canada). One might think the same applies to witnessing,
since once cannot ‘‘unwitness’’ without committing perjury (Posner
1998, 524). However, variable individual levels of effort have a much
greater effect on the probability of becoming a witness than they do on
becoming an 18-year-old man. One makes choices about how often one
goes out, where one goes, or how attentive one is. Furthermore, although
individual witnesses can be compelled to testify once they are identified, it
is far more difficult to compel someone to identify oneself as a witness.
21 Turning to the mandatory service more similar to compelled testimony,
jury duty is widely evaded, but it is unlikely to have significant ex-ante
5 Attempts by private plaintiffs’ lawyers to replicate such arrangements through payments to
named class representatives who serve as whistleblowers have been found illegal. See Kobaya-
shi & Ribstein (2007). The allowance of witness compensation by governmental plaintiffs but
not private ones may be due to concerns that private parties would set compensation too high
from a social perspective (as discussed in Part 3). Regulated rates would address this concern.
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behavioral effects. Jurors are not expected to bring anything of value to the
judicial process except themselves, and they cannot underproduce them-
selves. Fact witnesses, on the other hand are expected to bring valuable
information that improves the accuracy of litigation, and the possession
of this information varies with effort.
3. COMPLICATIONS
3.1. Perjury and Collusion
22Paying fact witnesses would have potential drawbacks that have to be bal-
anced against the benefits. Chief among these is the increased incentive for
perjury. Increasing the accuracy of litigation is a public good. In the sim-
plest witness payment scheme, all witnesses would be paid by the govern-
ment. This would eliminate the incentive to lie about what one saw for the
benefit of one side or another, since there would only be one payer. How-
ever, one might still be tempted to lie about whether one saw anything,
since it is the act of witnessing and not the content of the testimony that
would determine eligibility for payment.
23Perjury by fact witnesses could be discouraged through existing punish-
ments, and perhaps less drastic but more easily administrable means such
as withholding witness payments or barring witnesses whom a judge con-
cludes are not testifying truthfully from receiving future payments for wit-
nessing. However, there are limits to how strong these incentives can be. If
the incentives to avoid being found untruthful are too severe, or the stan-
dards for proving perjury are set too low, witnesses will be very reluctant to
provide truthful testimony that might appear to be perjured or incredible.
Rather than providing testimony that is actually true, the witnesses would
choose to provide testimony that is ‘‘safe’’ but at best redundant and at
worse misleading.
24Incentives for fabricating a story increase with the level of compensa-
tion. The lower the witness payment rate, the smaller the incentive to
claim that one has seen something when one has not, but at the same
time the smaller the increase in witnessing. However, perjury problems
are inherent in all witness testimony, and it is not clear whether a witness
payment system would have more of such problems than the current
regime. Currently, the only parties who have any ex ante incentive to wit-
ness and testify are those with a stake in the case. Thus the primary produc-
ers of testimonial evidence are interested parties—often the litigants
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themselves. Given that the stakes of the case are always greater than what a
payment to witness would be, the incentives to perjury may already be
higher than those created by witness payment. Even if witness payment
led to some fabricated testimony, it could reduce the proportion of perjured
testimony introduced into evidence.
25 The problem of tainted testimony also arises with expert witnesses,
who are selected and paid directly by the parties and consult with
them prior to giving testimony. Yet experts have some private disincen-
tives to perjure themselves. They are repeat players, and a bad reputa-
tion will hurt their livelihood. Furthermore, perjury by expert
witnesses can generally be detected, or at least contradicted by other
experts, who have access to the same facts. This constraint will be less
salient for perceptual witnesses, who might claim to have a unique van-
tage point, and for whom witness payment is more fortuitous and irreg-
ular. Yet concerns for reputation can cut both ways. Experts do not
want a reputation for perjured or discredited testimony. But they do
want a reputation for being useful to their client, which provides an
incentive for biased testimony. Perceptual witnesses, precisely because
of their market power, do not need to curry client favor. Thus it
would be hard to say a priori that perceptual witnesses would be
more likely to distort their testimony than experts.6
26 Finally, paying witnesses would also have an opposite effect on perjury.
Because payment will increase the number of people actually witnessing an
event, it will increase the expected cost of perjury by increasing the likeli-
hood of detection. It will be hard to maintain that one saw something if
multiple other witnesses say one was not at the scene. Thus payment has
both positive and negative effects on perjury.7
27 If witnesses can collude, they might corroborate each other’s fabricated
testimony. We do not believe that it is likely enough to significantly
decrease the desirability of payment. Courts are quite familiar with the
problem of collusion by witnesses, and naturally, a court would give less
6 We leave to one side the epistemological question of whether lying means something different
when it comes to facts one has perceived versus opinions one has formed.
7 Prosecution for perjury is rare, in part because of the cost of what is essentially secondary lit-
igation, and the difficulty of proving a statement false. However, the increased likelihood of
impeaching a fact witness is valuable even if it only results in the rejection of the testimony.
One could also imagine the use of small, judicially-imposed fines for rejected testimony, akin
to contempt sanctions.
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weight to corroboration when it appears more likely that witnesses may
have colluded on a story, for example, if they knew each other well prior
to the incident. Given that our discussion focusses on witnessing by
third parties, unrelated to the incident, we think that it would decrease
the likelihood that any particular witness is colluding.8
3.2. Adverse Selection and Crowding Out
28Closely related to the perjury problem are concerns about adverse selection
and crowding out. We have argued that the quantity of available testimony
will increase as compensation increases. However, if instituting payments
significantly decreases the quality of available testimony, it may not be ben-
eficial. The reliability of testimony from people who are only testifying for
pecuniary benefits may be lower than from those who are testifying or wit-
nessing out of a sense of civic duty.
29If the propensity to commit perjury is positively correlated with an indi-
vidual’s sensitivity to rewards for witnessing, concerns for adverse selection
might be an argument for low or no rewards for witnessing. On the other
hand, in many cases, the lack of a general mechanism to compensate wit-
nesses enhances the adverse selection problem. Under current conditions,
the people most likely to be tangibly rewarded for testimony are suspected
or convicted criminals, hardly the most trustworthy segment of the popu-
lation. One worries that even modest rewards to jailhouse informants
might induce them to perjure themselves.9 Finally, we note that the impact
of the adverse selection effect need not be monotonic. A small increase in
payments (from zero) might decrease the quality of witnesses, by picking
up the most opportunistic, but further increases in the payment might go
in the other direction.
8 A related concern is that if payments are sufficiently large, they might give potential witnesses
an incentive to encourage behavior that leads to lawsuits in which they can testify. Yet like
perjury, this is much more of problem in the implicit witness payment schemes that are
already in place. In whistleblower cases, the witness often has a close relationship with the
defendant (often an employer), and may have more reason and be in a position to entice
the defendant to engage in illegal behavior. Our discussion focusses on ‘‘stranger cases,’’
where a smaller proportion of potential witnesses would have prior relationships with the par-
ties. Furthermore it would be difficult to imagine that a potential witness could encourage
unlawful or tortuous behavior without some evidence of this coming out at trial; presumably
the statute could deny payment in such cases.
9 This explains the broad criticism of the use of jailhouse informants. Jailhouse snitches are crit-
icized as generating a great deal of false information because they have few other opportunities
to improve their position (Pew Charitable Trusts 2007).
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30 The Appendix considers a model in which courts can adjust their pay-
ment of a witness based on how credible they find the testimony. Our
results are that as long as payments can be conditioned on the court’s
beliefs about the prevalence of false testimony and the degree to which tes-
timony is consistent with the testimony of other agents, increasing the
rewards for testimony is unlikely to substantially decrease the reliability
of testimony, even if unreliable witnesses are substantially more sensitive
to monetary rewards than reliable witnesses. As long as some reliable wit-
nesses are sensitive to incentives, increasing the payment attracts at least
some reliable witnesses. As the number of witnesses increases, it becomes
easier to distinguish between reliable witnesses and unreliable witnesses,
and the difference between the expected payment for true witnesses as
opposed to false witnesses increases. Thus, although the unreliable witness
are more sensitive to the increased payment, their expected payment
increases less relative to true witnesses because the former are more likely
to be found unreliable when there are more other witnesses.
31 There is some evidence that providing payment for what had previously
been perceived to be voluntary or eleemosynary activity reduces the level of
the activity by depriving people of the (higher) nonpecuniary compensation.
A classic article by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) describes studies where the
imposition of a fine led more parents to pick up their children late at an Israeli
day care facility. The authors hypothesize that the imposition of the fine
reduced the parents’ feelings of civic duty to pick up their children on
time. The traditional argument against paying witnesses seems to invoke
such considerations. ‘‘The testimonial duty, like other civic duties, is to be per-
formed without pay, the sacrifice being an inherent burden of citizenship,’’ as
Wigmore put it.
32 However, it does not seem to us that fact witnessing is the kind of vol-
untary activity that is subject to crowding-out effects. For one, any civic
duty felt by people today is likely to be one of testifying, rather than wit-
nessing. People may feel obliged to testify if they have important factual
information, but few feel any civic duty to acquire factual information
that would qualify one to testify. Secondly, even now testimony is not a
voluntary activity, but rather one that can be mandated by subpoena.
3.3. Overwitnessing
33 Witnessing produces diminishing marginal returns in terms of social wel-
fare. If excessive payment is guaranteed to all witnesses, there may be too
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much witnessing. This is analogous to the overfishing problem: in an
unregulated market, too much effort is expended catching fish because
each additional fisherman gets the average production of all fishermen
rather than his own marginal product. However, unlike with fisheries, wit-
nessing and testimony is already part of an existing regulatory process, the
judicial system. Given judicial supervision of witness payments, the
expected payment to a witness need not be set at a witness’s average social
value. Since the regulator is setting the price, the regulator can always set a
reward low enough so there will not be overwitnessing. In any case, the
optimal number of witnesses is not just a function of the needs of proof
at trial, but also of deterring false or perjured witnesses. Thus additional
witnesses can add value by increasing the credibility of the other witnesses,
even if they did not themselves witness anything unique (see section 3.1).
34To see why overwitnessing is unlikely to be an unavoidable consequence
of such an incentive scheme we start with an examination of the original
overfishing problem presented by Gordon (1954). In this classic problem
of open access, each fisherman expects to catch an equal share of fish, so
each additional fisherman expects to bring in the average catch, rather
than his or her marginal product. If some of the fish that each new fisher-
man catches would have been caught by the existing fishermen, the mar-
ginal product is lower than the average, and each additional fisherman
causes the average catch to decline. Even when there are a socially optimal
number of fishermen, as long as the average catch is greater than the cost of
fishing, more will still want to enter, so in the unregulated fishery there will
tend to be more fishing than is socially optimal.
35Note that the overfishing problem arises partially from the lack of prop-
erty rights in the fishery. If the fishery was privately owned, the owner
could charge an access fee, and the access fee that would lead to the highest
profits for the owner would actually lead to efficient entry. We would
expect that there are usually no property rights or markets for ‘‘witness-
able’’ phenomena, and that access to witnessing would generally be
open. Just as open access to a fishery leads to overfishing, we might
worry that open access to witnessing would lead to overwitnessing. With
fact witnesses, it is certainly true that the marginal contribution of each
additional witness is likely to be decreasing, as in the fishing problem.
Much of the testimony of the additional witness could have been garnered
from the original witnesses. Indeed if the total payments available to all
witnesses were set to be equal to the total social value of witnessing, we
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would expect to see too much witnessing. However it is neither necessary,
nor even likely that the total payments be set at the social value.
3.4. Amount of Compensation
36 Any fact-witness payment regime would face the problem of setting com-
pensation correctly. If rates are not regulated, and testimony were not
compelled10 the monopoly power of many perceptual witnesses could
lead to an inefficient hold-up problem, where witnesses might refuse to tes-
tify unless their demands for payment were met.
37 In a world of unregulated witness payments, we could have more wit-
nessing, but less testimony than under the current no payment regime.
Suppose that allowing payment increases the likelihood that there is a wit-
ness from 30 percent to 50 percent. Any actual witness knows that there are
two types of plaintiffs. She knows that 40 percent of the plaintiffs had no
independent proof of the defendant’s liability and these plaintiffs would
pay up to $1000 for her to testify. The remaining 60 percent of plaintiffs
have some other evidence of liability, and would pay only $300 for testi-
mony. We can see that an actual witness will demand $1000 to testify,
since she would expect $1000 to testify, rather than $300 if she demands
only $300. If unregulated payments are allowed, 60 percent of witnesses
will refuse to testify because the plaintiff will be unwilling to meet their
demand of $1000, so the likelihood of actual testimony will only be 20 per-
cent. On the other hand, a regulated payment of $200 may have less impact
on witnessing, increasing the likelihood of witnessing only to 40 percent,
but all of those witnesses would wish to testify.
38 In practice, the subpoena power is constrained by the lawyers’ limited
information about who has relevant information. In civil suits, it can be
extremely difficult to compel testimony from third parties who insist
they know nothing. Witness payments encourage self-identification by
witnesses who are satisfied with the rate of payment. The voluntary self-
identification of these witnesses can also reveal information about the exis-
tence of others who have not self-identified. If payment is only made avail-
10 The following example assumes that the plaintiff cannot compel testimony. We note that if
testimony can be compelled, the hold-up problem disappears. We believe that in most
cases, it would be impossible for a potential plaintiff to identify potential witnesses and com-
mit to make payments to them before the incident. In cases where this is possible, we do actu-
ally see this occurring (as in the example of the associate assigned to witness an employee
termination, described in section 2.3.)
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able for those who self-identify, it may make up for some of the limitations
of subpoenas.
39Ideally, the rate would be set so that the expected payment for a witness
is equal to the expected marginal social value of her witnessing. Because the
value of an additional witness depends in part on how many other wit-
nesses there are, determining the witness payment should depend on the
supply of witnesses. A payment that is too low will not do much to
solve the under-witnessing problem, while, an overly high rate could
lead to potentially wasteful rent seeking activity, as too many people
would seek to witness the same thing.
40As will be shown in the model, if potential witnesses have no private
information about the costs and the social benefit of witnessing a par-
ticular incident, it is possible to induce efficient incentives for witness-
ing with a fixed payment to all witnesses. If potential witnesses do
have private information about the value of witnessing, perhaps
because they can predict how many others are likely to witness the
same incident, it might be possible to achieve efficiency with a pay-
ment that depends on the number of other witnesses who are avail-
able. However, if the potential witnesses have private information
about the benefits of witnessing that are not easily verifiable (for
example, the quality of other witnesses), it may not be possible to
achieve first best efficient investment in witnessing. Nonetheless if wit-
nessing has any social value, the current policy of no payment at all is
never likely to be optimal.
41A frequent cause of skepticism regarding price regulation is that it is
unlikely that the government or regulatory agency will get the price
‘‘right,’’ while it is likely that the price in a free market will more closely
reflect the social value. As explained by Shavell (1997), unlike the mar-
ket-mediated rewards for fishing or treasure hunting, there are few market
forces that tend to make the rewards for any use of the legal system equal to
their social value, regardless of whether there are explicit subsidies or taxes.
Thus there is no reason to believe that allowing a free market for fact wit-
nesses is any more likely to result in the ‘‘right’’ price, strengthening the
argument for a regulated price. Since we discuss a system of regulated pay-
ments, concerns about overwitnessing can be alleviated by offering lower
rewards.
42In the fishing example, we start with the overfishing that would occur in
the free market, and impose some form of tax or access fee to correct it. We
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take the opposite approach with witnessing. We start with the underwit-
nessing that occurs in the absence of payments and offer a subsidy to cor-
rect it. Constructing an expression for the value of an additional witness
from first principles would involve looking at the social impact of the
underlying behaviors the legal system is trying to regulate, along with
assigning values to the abstract concept of dispensing justice, and that is
far beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we will assume a reduced
form expression for the value of witnesses. Let us use the function V(x)
to represent the social value of witnessing where x is the number of wit-
nesses. We assume that V 0(x)  0 for all x, and that there exists some x,
such that if x > x, V 00(x) < 0. That is to say that having more witnesses
is never harmful, but that at some point (x), the marginal value of each
additional witness decreases.11 We could imagine that having too many
people testify could be undesirable because it could lead to long trials
and high costs, but it seems unlikely that having too many people witness
can be detrimental to adjudication.
43 We also assume that there is a cost to witnessing, and that this cost
varies among people. Thus if there are J potential witnesses, each witness
has a cost of witnessing cj. Importantly, we would assume that there is
some possibility that cj 0 for some j. In other words, there is a possibil-
ity that there will be some witnessing, even if there are no rewards. Let c
be a ranking of costs so that cn is the cost for the n
th lowest cost witness.
And let N(c) be an inverse cost function defined so that N(c) is the num-
ber of potential witnesses with cost less than c. Let K be the set of actual
witnesses, let k be the size of K. So k is the number of witnesses and
N(ck)¼ k. The optimal allocation maximizes V(k)
P
j˛Kcj. Let k* be
such that V 0(k*)¼ ck*. If the social planner sets the reward at r¼ ck*,
then we will have efficiency.
44 It may be difficult to know what the optimal level of witnessing is in any
particular case. For one thing, the distribution of costs N(c) will tend to
vary from case to case, leading to variation in k* and hence ck*. Since
the costs differ, a fixed reward will result in wide variation in the number
of witnesses. For example, there might be many more witnesses to an
event on a busy intersection than in a dark alley on a winter night. A
fixed payment would over-incentivize witnessing of easy-to- see events,
11 We do not assume that V 0 0(x) < 0 for any x> 0 because there might be cases where for cred-
ibility reasons, two or three witnesses might be much more valuable than only one.
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and not give enough incentives for events that are difficult to witness. It
would most likely be far too cumbersome for the courts to independently
estimate a cost function for each witnessed event.
45However, the number of actual witnesses is probably a pretty good indi-
cator of the cost; when there are few witnesses, it is reasonable to conclude
that costs of witnessing were high, and when there are many witnesses the
cost of witnessing was most likely low. Thus the courts could adopt a
reward schedule that decreases in the number of witness. If the social plan-
ner does not know N(c), it is not possible to directly identify k*. However if
we assume that the court still knows V(k), and it is feasible to construct a
reward system with a variable reward r(k) such that r(k)¼V 0(k), then each
potential witness’s expected returns from witnessing would be equal to
the marginal social returns. Thus we would achieve the information-
constrained first-best result.
46If potential witnesses have private information about the value of
their testimony, so that V(k) is not known by the court, then it is not
possible to provide optimal incentives unless the payment can vary
with the quality of witnessing. Any incentive scheme that provides the
same reward for witnessing regardless of the quality of witnessing
might attract too much low-quality witnessing and not enough high-
quality witnessing.
47Of course, the difficulty of determining social value and optimal pay-
ment is not confined to fact witnesses. This is just an instance of a prob-
lem that cuts across the legal system. While it is difficult to assess the
marginal social value of any input into the legal system, society implic-
itly values many of the inputs when it chooses how much to spend on
them. For one, society makes implicit judgments about how important
it is to have accurate criminal trials when it decides how many police,
prosecutors, judges, and public defenders to employ. Few argue that
the fact that we are not confident of the exact value of any of these
inputs implies that we should not pay for them. Similarly, difficulties
in valuing additional witness do not mean that they should not be
rewarded.
3.5. Testimony Fees
48As discussed above, testimony is a distinct activity from witnessing and has
separate costs, which include travel to court and the opportunity cost of
time in court, and in a criminal case may include the risk of retaliation
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from the defendant.12 Because testifying can be compelled when one has
witnessed a relevant event, undercompensated costs of testifying effectively
serve as a tax on witnessing. Jurisdictions are divided on the extent to
which witnesses can be reimbursed by lawyers in civil suits for the cost
of testifying. In criminal suits, almost all jurisdictions provide some com-
pensation for testimony expenses, but they generally are vastly under-com-
pensatory (well below minimum wage).13 The analysis here strongly
supports full reimbursement of all expenses including opportunity costs
and preparation time in both criminal and civil cases. Of course, if fees
for fact witnesses were available, under-compensatory reimbursement
for testimony would lower the effective payment.
49 While paying for witnessing increases the amount of witnessing but may
also cause some problems, an effective negative payment reduces witness-
ing but has no socially desirable consequences. Indeed, if witnesses are not
compensated for the opportunity costs of their time and testifying—above
and beyond any fee for their having obtained valuable information—it
could have an adverse selection affect. The greater someone’s opportunity
cost of time, the greater their incentive to avoid or not disclose having wit-
nessed. If one believes low opportunity costs are associated with unreliabil-
ity, the current system selects for the worst witnesses. A concern with
payment for witnessing is overproduction for easy-to-witness events,
things that many people see. Undercompensation for testimony has the
12 See O’Flaherty & Sethi 2010, which models the strategic decisions of defendants who may
threaten witnesses, and witnesses who may or may not testify despite threats. O’Flaherty
and Sethi do not discuss rewards to witnessing as distinct from in-court testimony. They pre-
dict that an increase in returns to testimony (which can indirectly reward witnessing) is likely
to lead to more testimony and more conviction despite more threats. Their work shares a fea-
ture with ours: that the value of testimony may be nonlinear in the number of witnesses. As a
result, they also find that expectations are important when there are multiple witnesses. Spe-
cifically, they find that when one witness does not expect that a threat will be likely to deter
other witnesses, she herself is less likely to be deterred.
Although our focus is on civil cases, where threats of violent retaliation are presumed to be
rare, we believe that considerations of witness intimidation argue for more compensation of
witnesses. For one, witnesses who are strangers to the parties but are encouraged by the pros-
pect of payments may be less sensitive to threats because it is likely more difficult for the
defendant to retaliate against witnesses they do not have a relationship with. Secondly,
these payments make it much more likely that there will be multiple witnesses. This may
decrease the value of any one witness, making threats less effective, and also increases the like-
lihood that a dangerous defendant is incarcerated before he has a chance to actually retaliate,
which should make a witness more likely to testify despite a threat.
13 For example, the New Hampshire Department of Justice Witness Payment Program provides
a maximum $24 a day for expenses.
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opposite effect, discouraging the production of the most valuable kinds of
witnessing. For example, for events with only a single witness, his testi-
mony is relatively valuable. However, it is easier for him to not disclose
having witnessed, as others cannot put him at the scene, and thus under-
compensation may disproportionately select against the most valuable
witnesses.
CONCLUSION
50This paper has examined the economics of fact witnessing, and the differ-
ences in the market for fact and expert witnesses. It concludes that
the principal economic difference between fact and expert witnesses is
the market power of the former, which justifies compulsory process. Not
paying perceptual witnesses a market rate is certainly justifiable. Yet
the current regime of zero payment produces socially suboptimum levels
of witnessing relative to a properly calibrated payment regime. Very
small payments (above all actual expenses and opportunity costs of
testifying) might have some (small) social benefit compared to regime of
nonpayment.
APPENDIX
51The formal analysis in the body of the paper assumes that all witnesses are
equal, and more problematically, that the quality of the witness does not
depend on the reward structure being given. Even though we believe
there are good reasons why people who are encouraged to be witnesses
by payment will not generally be less credible than witnesses who come for-
ward without payment, we think that a well designed system would pro-
vide safeguards and disincentives for false testimony. Below, we model a
system of incentives in which payment for testimony depends on the extent
to which the court believes that the purported witness actually witnessed
the event.
Model
52Imagine that there are N members of the population, split into two kinds
of people, honest and dishonest. The likelihood that any member of the
population is honest is k. In addition to any cash reward, honest people
receive a warm fuzzy feeling, worth b, from testifying truthfully about an
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event they have witnessed. Honest people are also unwilling to falsely
claim they have witnessed an event. We assume there is a cost of actually
witnessing, which is distributed according to F(c). Thus when the expected
payoff from truthfully witnessing an event is uT, the expected number of
honest witnesses is NkF(uTþ b). The remaining fraction of the popula-
tion is dishonest, and willing to make a false claim to be a witness, and
their cost of doing so is G(c). For simplicity, we assume that these people
never actually witness the event. Thus the expected number of false
witnesses is N(1 k)G(uF).
53 If one could impose an arbitrarily high penalty for perjury, we could dis-
courage perjury even by those who have a low likelihood of being caught.
This would naturally make offering rewards for witnessing more attractive.
But as we noted in the body of the paper, extremely large penalties for per-
jury might discourage truthful witnesses from testifying, and thus we
might assume that the penalty for being found guilty of perjury is fixed
at some practical maximum, but that the courts have available a less strin-
gent penalty of withholding payment to witnesses if it is convinced the wit-
ness’s testimony was not truthful.14 To be conservative, in our model we
assume no penalties other than the withholding of payment are available.
54 Because of the lower standard for denying a reward on the basis that a
witness is not valuable, we will assume that it is possible to deny or decrease
payment based on circumstantial evidence. This implies that an increase or
decrease in the quality of circumstantial evidence can be self-reinforcing,
leading to a possibility of multiple equilibria. When evidence is generally
scant and of poor quality, it is difficult to know whether any particular wit-
ness is trustworthy and there is less difference in the expected compensa-
tion between false and true witnessing, leading to lower quality. On
the other hand, when evidence is expected to be of good quality, it is
easier to identify false witnessing, so there will be fewer false witnesses
and testimony will generally be more credible. With the same legal rules
regarding payments, it is possible that there could be one equilib-
rium where the general expectation that witnesses will generally be high
quality discourages false witnesses, and another one where all witnesses
expect that there will be lots of false testimony, and thus false witnessing
may avoid detection.
14 Perhaps the court could use a preponderance of the evidence standard, or a clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard to justify refusal to pay the witness payments.
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55Formally, we assume that there are J potential facts relating to the event
that can be witnessed, and there is some likelihood q that one fact is salient.
A salient fact is one that is particularly likely to be noticed for reasons that
are particular to the incident witnessed. If there is a salient fact, the likeli-
hood that any particular true witness notices is it is l. An example of a fact
would be ‘‘The perpetrator is wearing a blue jacket.’’
56However, when a false witness fabricates a statement, since he didn’t
actually witness the incident, and thus has no knowledge that any one of
the facts is salient, he must guess whether or not any fact was salient. Fur-
thermore, even when the false witness correctly guesses that there is a sali-
ent fact, he must guess correctly what that salient fact is. Thus when two or
more witnesses report, but disagree on either whether there was a salient
fact, or what the fact was, this is a signal that at least one of them may
be fabricating a statement. On the other hand, when there are consistent
reports about a particular fact, this is a strong signal that both the witnesses
actually saw the incident.
57Consider the expected payoffs of a true witness when there is one other
witness. If the other witness is true, it is quite likely that they give consistent
reports about the incident. On the other hand, if the witness is false, they
are more likely to report on disjoint sets of facts, creating some suspicion
of falsehood, and if they do report on the same fact, their reports are likely
to be inconsistent. Thus a true witness is much less likely to be found cred-
ible if the other witness is false.
58In equilibrium, a false witness will sometimes bluff, claiming to have wit-
nessed a salient fact. We can see this by noting that if only true witnesses
claimed to have noticed a salient fact, a false witness will always be thought
to be a true witness when she claims to have noticed a salient fact. On the
other hand, a false witness has less incentive to report having witnessed a sali-
ent fact than a true witness. Since the false witness doesn’t know which fact
was actually salient, he is guessing, and no other witness is likely to have
reported the same fact as salient. Even if the other witness did by chance
report the fact as salient, it is likely that their reports about the content of
the fact do not agree, regardless of whether the other witness is true or false.
59Naturally, the desirability of offering rewards to witnesses in this model
will depend on the values of the parameters. If there are many truthful
witnesses who will enter purely out of civic duty, and the majority of
those who respond to incentives are dishonest fabricators, offering any
reward will naturally degrade the quality of evidence. However, there is
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a mitigating factor: even if the false witnesses are very sensitive to expected
payments, increasing the rewards may not draw in too many false wit-
nesses. Because it is very difficult for the false witnesses to prove that
they were actual witnesses, the payment of the false witnesses is very depen-
dent on the court’s prior beliefs regarding the likely truthfulness of wit-
nesses. When more false witnesses are expected to enter, they expect to
be paid less, because the court is more likely to assume any witness is
false unless her statement is consistent with that of another witness.
60 Figures 1 and 2 show the results of simulations under two judicial stan-
dards for payment.15 In each of these simulations the payment to the wit-
ness would be dependent on the posterior belief the court placed on the
witness being a true witness. For the preponderance standard, the payment
was equal to the payment factor if the posterior the witness was true was
greater than 52 percent. If the posterior that the witness was true was
less than 48 percent, the witness was not paid, and the payoff went linearly
from 0 to full between 48 percent and 52 percent.16 For the ‘‘clear and con-
vincing standard’’ the witness received full payment only if the posterior on
truth was above 77 percent and the witness received no payment if the pos-
terior was below 73 percent. For both payment standards, it was assumed
that the courts would accept at most three witnesses. If more than three
witnesses came forward, the court would randomly choose three. Aside
from this, it was assumed that the payment to a witness who did testify
would not directly depend on the number of witnesses; however, the num-
ber of other witnesses and their testimony would affect the posterior the
court places on any one witness being true. Unsurprisingly, the simulations
showed that true witnesses generally preferred there to be more witnesses,
and false witnesses often preferred there to be fewer other witnesses.
15 The assumptions for simulations in both figures are as follows: k¼ 0.3, l¼ 0.99, q¼ .6,
N¼ 20, b¼ .1, F(c)¼G(c)¼ c.
16 It was necessary to limit the steepness of the relationship between belief and payment in order
to ensure that the simulations converged. However, such an assumption could be justified by
noting that if a witness testified in a way such that it was very nearly equally likely that she was
true or false, it would be very difficult to predict whether a judge would approve a payment or
not. One could argue that these simulations are assuming too much precision by the court. A
third simulation where payment was linear in the likelihood that the witness was true (i.e., if
there was a 20 percent likelihood that the witness was true, the witness was paid with 20 per-
cent probability) was also performed. The results of that simulation are available from the
authors; unsurprisingly they showed that the linear payment was less effective in soliciting
truthful witnesses than either of the simulations presented.
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61The horizontal axis on both of the figures represents the payment (in
arbitrary units) that a witness who testifies, and whom the judge is certain
is telling the truth, would receive. For the plots of the proportion of wit-
nesses who tell the truth, the vertical axis simply represents that propor-
tion. For the plots of expected payoffs for the true witness or the false
witness, the vertical axis is in the same units as the payment on the hori-
zontal axis. There are two reasons why a witness doesn’t expect to receive
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the full payment. First, there may be enough witnesses that she is not
chosen to testify. Second, even if she is chosen to testify she may not convince
the judge that her testimony is sufficiently credible to merit payment. One
can see that in all simulations, the expected payoff for a true witness is greater
than that for a false witness, because witnesses who actually saw the incident
are more likely to have their testimony corroborated. Furthermore, the ratio
between the expected payment for a true witness and that for a false witness
tends to increase as the payments increase. When there are more witnesses, it
is more likely that the testimony of a true witness is corroborated, and more
likely that the false witness’s testimony is cast into doubt.
62 As can be seen from the simulations, for the preponderance standard,
increasing the payments to witnessing did increase the number of both
true and false witnesses. Initially increasing the payment substantially
decreased the average quality of witnesses, which was to be expected,
given our assumption that only true witnesses were motivated by civic
duty. However, further increases in payments increased the quantity of wit-
nesses but did not significantly decrease the quality. As the payments for
credible testimony increased, the incentive to falsely claim to have witnessed
the event is dampened by the increasing number of true witnesses, and the
increasing likelihood of being contradicted and not receiving payment.
63 The clear and convincing standard was more effective at encouraging
truthful witnesses without attracting false witnesses. Requiring a higher
standard of credibility for testimony makes it much less likely that false wit-
nesses will reap any reward, but does not affect true witnesses as much.
Interestingly, increasing the payment on the clear and convincing standard
at times increased both the quality and quantity of testimony. This can be
explained as a virtuous circle. The increased payment draws more true wit-
nesses, which makes it more likely that any true witness’s story will be cor-
roborated, in turn making truthful witnessing even more attractive without
significantly increasing the attractiveness of false witnessing. It should be
noted that the finding that using the ‘‘clear and convincing’’ standard is
more effective is not surprising given the general result in contract theory
that high-powered incentives tend to be more effective.
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